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Abstract
In the period following WW II. until the country accessed the Euro-
pean Union, cartels were legalized in Austria, upon registration with the
Austrian Cartel Court. We obtained access to the registration data, and
scanned them all towards a microeconomic analysis of contracting behav-
ior between firms competing, in principle, in their respective markets. In
this paper, we give a detailed account of our procedure of coding the data
from the scanned documents.
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1 Introduction
From 1951 on, Austrian law foresaw that cartels were legalized by notification
to a cartel registry. The cartels were legal once the registration was approved.
With Austria’s accession to the European Community, European competition
law had to be applied. Thus, from 1995 on, the approval of cartels was restricted
to comply with E.U. competition law and the European Commission started to
ensure the application.
The first entries into the cartel registry we found are from 1973.1 The last
entry into the registry was in 2002.
We developed a coding protocol to format the information available mainly
from the contracts archived in the cartel registry. In Section 2 we describe the
institutional background, the data sources and how we proceeded. In the en-
suing Sections 3-5 we specify and explain the categories we have chosen. In
Section 3, we categorize general descriptives; in Section 4 the economic justifi-
cations given by the cartelists when applying for registration, and procedural
aspects related to the latter; and in Section 5 the main economic characteristics.
2 Data Generating Process and Coding Proce-
dure
Cartels had to be approved upon an application, including a justification of the
initiative to create a cartel, and the proposed cartel contract. Also, prices were
monitored, and in most sectors, price changes had to be approved by public
authorities. Here we briefly describe the procedures involved, and the data
available on the cartels. Then we explain how we developed the categories for
coding the data.
2.1 Institutional Background
The Cartel Court (CC) had to approve any application to form, and to continue
a cartel. As much as we know of, it always did so when the recommendation
by the ’Parity Committee on Cartel Matters’, consisting of representatives of
companies and labor ("Paritätischer Ausschuss für Kartellangelegenheiten"),
was positive.
In order to understand economic policy in Austria in the relevant time pe-
riod, it is central to know that interest group influence in Austria was institution-
alized via the chambers of commerce, labor and agriculture that, respectively,
represent companies, workers and farmers. Membership was compulsory. These
three chambers and the Austrian Trade Union Federation form the so-called
social partners. The chambers represent membership interests at all levels of
government. For the relevant time period, social partners had a decisive influ-
ence on economic policy in general. Consensus-decision making was the rule.
1Older entries no longer exist.
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Thus even an informal common position of the social partners was taken seri-
ously by industry.
In addition to the right of the chambers of labor and commerce to appoint
the members of the Parity Committee, all three chambers as well as the Federal
Financial Agency ("Finanzprokuratur") were parties of the proceedings.2 This
included the right to ask for an in-depth review of the application and for
additional information on each cartel.
Distinct from the Parity Committee, a ’Parity Commission’ ("Paritätische
Kommission") consisting of all four social partners was in charge of monitoring
prices, and with this at least in part also monitored the cartelists’ price for-
mation. Typically industry representatives submitted a proposed price increase
and provided cost data to justify that price increase. The Parity Commission
then approved or rejected the price increase.3 A common position of all mem-
bers of the Parity Commission was taken seriously by the companies, and prices
were not increased above the approved levels.4 In effect, the proceedings leading
to the application for price hikes allowed for collusive pricing arrangements, as
long as these arrangements were stable and thus did not require more elaborate
clauses such as punishment in case of downward deviation from the agreed upon
price.
2.2 Data Sources
All documents archived in the Cartel Court were made available to us. These
documents include the cartel contracts as proposed by the participants, as well
as additional documentation.5 The scope of the archived additional documents
varies and includes applications to form, to continue, and to terminate a cartel
as well as judicial approval decrees. Also available are the annual reports of the
Parity Committee that summarize its activity and its most important decisions.
2.3 Procedure
We scanned the material available in some 125 folders archived in the Cartel
Court’s registry, including additional documentation on entries, mergers and
exits and on economic data on the cartels.6 We also scanned the annual reports
of the Joint Committee for economic data on the cartels. We so far did not
reconstruct the approved absolute price increases that are documented mostly
as relative price increases in the minutes of the price determination proceedings.
2The Federal Financial Agency represents the federal government in a court of law.
3Effectively the Subcommittee for Prices ("Preisunterausschuss") was in charge of moni-
toring prices.
4Some cartels were explicitly formed to maintain prices at the approved level.
5According to officials, the archive is not complete. Some agreements and additional doc-
uments were taken out and not returned.
6Here we consider all documents archived in the Cartel Court. In fact, some contain
vertical agreements between one upstream firm and its downstream partners, that we consider
to involve pure vertical restraints rather than cartel arrangements.
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We coded the information contained in the contracts we felt most pertinent in
about 200 categories.
2.4 Variable Types
The coding mostly involves binary variables. If a contract clause as specified in
the code is included in the agreement, we enter a “1”. A “0” is entered otherwise.
Note that there may have been clauses the cartelists agreed upon informally,
that are not contained in the formal agreement. Hence a “0” does not necessarily
imply that the relevant clause was not part of the cartel arrangement. In some
situations we use nominal categories. We use, for example, the official statistical
industry classification scheme ÖNACE (Austrian NACE) to classify the activ-
ity of the cartel. Dates, frequencies etc. are numerically coded. Finally, for
some information, we use a text format - for example for the products involved,
detailing the statistical industry classification.
3 Summary Information on Cartels and Cartel
Agreements
3.1 Cartel and Contract Identification
In Table 1, under 1.1, we assign a running number to each cartel. A cartel might
be organized on the basis of a series of subsequent or adjacent agreements7,
contained in one or more folders as deposited in the Cartel Court. Under 1.2, we
assign a running identification number after the cartel identifier. For instance,
3.5 signifies the fifth consecutive cartel agreement of the cartel with the running
number three. Under 1.3, we assign a short english subject title to the cartel
that aims to adress the relevant products and/or services and the relevant area.
In the Cartel Court registry, the individual agreements are contained in
folders under possibly differing registry numbers, indicated for each contract
under 1.4.
Table 1: Identifiers for Cartels and Agreements
Nr Name Variable Type Source
1.1 cartel number integer assigned
1.2 contract identification number decimal assigned
1.3 title of the cartel text assigned
1.4 cartel registry number text CC folder
number
Henceforth all tabulations relate to a specific agreement, as indexed under
1.2.
7For example, a paper producer agrees on a cartel with an already existing cartel in the
paper industry.
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3.2 Relevant Products and Geographical Area
In Table 2 under 2.1 the products subject to the agreement are named in full
text. Under 2.4 they are coded according to 4-digit ÖNACE.8 Under 2.2, we
take a best guess of whether the cartelized product(s) is/are potentially the
only product(s) produced by the firms participating in the cartel. Under 2.3,
we code the regional (subnational) or export market in case the cartel does not
cover the national Austrian market. Note that with this code, we can identify
any changes in products and/or markets served by the very cartel.
Some cartel contracts involve firms in two vertically related industries. In
this case, we note, under 2.5, the ÖNACE 4 digit classification for the down-
stream industry concerned.
Table 2: Relevant Product(s) and Markets
Nr Name Variable Type Source
2.1 products text agreement
2.2 no other products produced by
cartel firms (estimate)
binary agreement
2.3 market (if not Austria) text agreement
2.4 ÖNACE 4-digits (upstream, if
applicable)
nominal assigned
2.5 Downstream ÖNACE 4-digits, if
applicable
nominal assigned
3.3 Cartel Participants and Length of Agreement
In Table 3 we specify the number of firms involved in the cartel agreement under
3.1. If the contract involves vertically related firms, we sort into upstream and
downstream firms.9 We take a best guess if that is unclear.
As a proxy for the complexity of the agreements, we take its number of
pages.
8We use the ÖNACE 95 classification scheme. That scheme is the Austrian national
implementation of NACE Revision 1. NACE Revision 1 was subject to EU legislation in
1990.
9In the case where the list of cartel participants was missing, the number of participants
is taken from the additional documents.
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Table 3: Number of Participants and Length of Cartel Agreement
Nr Name Variable Type Source
3.1 number of firms (upstream, if ap-
plicable)
integer agreement
3.2 number of firms downstream (if
applicable)
integer agreement
3.3 upstream/downstream allotment
estimate (if applicable)
binary
3.4 number of pages of the agree-
ment
integer agreement
3.4 Start and End Dates of an Agreement
In several instances, informal - or even formal - cartel agreements preceded the
first agreement contained in the registry. In Table 4 we document the start
and end dates of the cartel. Under 4.1 we code the date of any informal (oral)
cartel arrangement between the cartelists, if mentioned in the first documented
cartel agreement; under 4.2 we code the starting date for the first formal cartel
arrangement10, and under 4.3 the date of the agreement under scrutiny.
As to the termination date of the registry folder11, we have two sources of
information: a formal termination decision by the Cartel Court, or the termi-
nation date as found on the front page of the registry folder.12 Based on the
cartel number and the termination date of the registry folder, we calculate the
terminate date of the cartel.
Table 4: Start and End Dates
Nr Name Variable Type Source
4.1 first recorded starting date date agreement
4.2 starting date of first formal
agreement
date agreement
4.3 date of current agreement date agreement
4.4 termination date of folder date CC folder
CC decision
4.5 termination date of cartel date calculated
In Table 5, we code information on the duration of the cartel agreement.
10We do not necessarily have documentation of that.
11There is one termination date for each cartel registry number. For those cartels that
reappear in another registry folder, the cartel - identified by the cartel number - continues.
12In the latter case, we observe only the year. We took the 31st of December as the
termination date.
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Table 5: Voluntary Entry/Exit: Duration of the contract
Nr Name Variable Type Source
5.1 specified duration of agreement
in years
integer agreement
5.2 open-ended agreement binary agreement
5.3 expiration date of the agreement date agreement
3.5 Entries, Exits, and Mergers Involving Cartel Mem-
bers
Some cartels are described by consecutive contracts, drafted solely because firms
entered, exited, or merged. In the cases in which these changes were mentioned
explicitely, we have a complete account of the changes in cartel composition
as based on all documents available heretofore. Otherwise, we did not record
changes in the composition of the cartel between two contracts, but only the
number of cartelists. This implies in particular that their composition could
have changed at a constant size of the cartel. In Table 6 we note these changes
in the number of cartelists. We record under 6.1 the number of firms that enter
anew with the current agreement. In line 6.2 the respective entry dates are
recorded.13 Under 6.3 and 6.4, we proceed similarly for exits, and under 6.5
and 6.6 for mergers, respectively. Note that we code mergers only in the case
they take place between two (or more) cartelists. Thus, a merger of one cartelist
with one or more outsiders is not part of the code.
Table 6: Entries, Exits and Mergers
Nr Name Variable Type Source
6.1 entry: number of new firms integer additional
documents
6.2 entry date date additional
documents
6.3 exit: number of firms integer additional
documents
6.4 exit date date additional
documents
6.5 merger: reduction in number of
firms by
integer additional
documents
6.6 merger date date additional
documents
13Line 6.2 is repeated in case there are several entry, exit and merger dates.
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3.6 Industry Information
For some cartels, we found data on the percentage market share of the cartel,
the percentage market share of the competitive fringe and the percentage im-
port shares for the relevant product(s). This information is collected in Table 7.
Here we differentiate explicitly between the three different sources agreement,
additional documents and annual report. Table 8 contains comparable informa-
tion on the competitive fringe (if it exists), and Table 9 on the import share of
products in focus.
Table 7: Cartel Market Share
Nr Name Variable Type Source
7.1 cartel market share (agreement) fraction agreement
7.2 cartel market share (additional fraction additional
documents) documents
7.3 cartel market share (annual fraction annual
report) report
Table 8: Competitive Fringe Market Share
Nr Name Variable Type Source
8.1 market share competitive fringe
(agreement)
fraction agreement
8.2 market share competitive fringe fraction additional
(additional documents) documents
8.3 market share competitive fringe fraction annual
(annual report) report
Table 9: Import Share
Nr Name Variable Type Source
9.1 market share imports (agree-
ment)
fraction agreement
9.2 market share imports (additional fraction additional
documents) documents
9.3 market share imports (annual fraction annual
report) report
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4 Institutional Detail, Cartelists’ Justifications,
Procedural Aspects in Cartel Formation
4.1 Institutional Detail
We want to get a full picture of the cartel duration over several successive
agreements. In Table 10, we code under 10.1 whether there is a precursory
agreement. Under 10.2, we record the identification number of the precursory
agreement in case it is part of our documentation at hand, and under 10.3 we
record the end date of the precursory agreement.14 As a double check, we also
ask for the identification number of the subsequent agreement. The termination
date of the registry folder and thus the last agreement in the folder is coded
above under 4.4. Under 10.5 we specify reasons for its termination, inasmuch
given.
Observe that the termination date of the last agreement coincides with the
termination of the cartel. Under 10.6 we ask whether the cartel specified in
the current agreement is connected to any other cartel; if yes, that cartel’s
registry number is documented here. Finally, we code under 10.7 the name
of the lawyer in charge of the agreement; mostly this individual was also the
authorized representative of the cartel in court.15
Continuing on the institutional context, we code under 10.8 and 10.9, re-
spectively, reference in the contract to one of the two common forms of price
regulation during the period of the cartels: Official price regulation as done by
the ministries, and price changes as approved by the Parity Commission.
At last, we note whether a cartel was registered as bagatelle cartel. Such a
cartel did not need to register since it was below a legal threshold. But some
cartels still registered - presumably to make the contract binding.
14The start date of the precursory agreement is coded in the code for that agreement.
15We took the name of the first lawyer. If there were several lawyers, we took note of them
in an additional field.
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Table 10: Institutional Details
Nr Name Variable Type Source
10.1 precursory agreement if men-
tioned
binary agreement
10.2 ID-number of precursory nominal assigned
agreement if documented ID-number
10.3 end date of precursory date precursory
agreement if documented agreement
10.4 ID number of subsequent nominal assigned
agreement, if documented ID-number
10.5 reason for termination text additional
documents
10.6 reference to other cartels text cartel regi-
stry number
10.7 lawyer in charge of the text additional
agreement documents
10.8 official price regulation binary agreement
10.9 price regulation via Parity Com-
mission
binary agreement
10.10 bagatelle cartel binary additional
documents
4.2 Economic Justification for Cartel Formation
Upon application the cartelists were required to provide a justification for the
formation of the cartel. Whereas this may have involved the production of
lyrics, it is interesting to document the market deficiencies the cartelists aim to
resolve within a co-operative arrangement. The categories are self-explanatory,
but the specific wording in the application might require some interpretation.
Multiple answers are possible.16
16Some economic justications are taken from the additional documents, too.
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Table 11: Economic Justification
Nr Name Variable Type Source
11.1 cut-throat competition binary agreement
11.2 excessive seller power to the car-
tel
binary agreement
11.3 excessive buyer power from the
cartel
binary agreement
11.4 lack of security of supply binary agreement
11.5 lack of job security binary agreement
11.6 lack of organization of the mar-
ket
binary agreement
11.7 excessive foreign competition binary agreement
11.8 lack of international competitive-
ness
binary agreement
11.9 lack of quality of products binary agreement
11.10 excessive transport costs binary agreement
11.11 excessive marketing costs binary agreement
11.12 lack of economies of scale binary agreement
11.13 lack of economies of scope binary agreement
11.14 lack of distributive justice (only
in vertical agreements)
binary agreement
11.15 lack of transparency of competi-
tion
binary agreement
4.3 Cartel Review
As mentioned before, the cartel application was sometimes subject to a review.
We differentiate between review requests by the four parties - the chambers of
commerce, labor and agriculture as well as the federal financial agency ("Fi-
nanzprokuratur").
Table 12: Cartel Review: Requests by
Nr Name Variable Type Source
12.1 chamber of labor binary additional
documents
12.2 federal financial agency binary additional
documents
12.3 chamber of commerce binary additional
documents
12.4 chamber of agriculture binary additional
documents
Sometimes the Parity Committee required changes in the proposed cartel
contract. We summarize such changes in Table 13. We specify under 13.1
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whether the registration procedure led to changes in the agreement, and code
under 13.2 reasons for the changes. For example, in later years the Parity
Committee often dictated a time limit for the cartels. Furthermore, we code
if disagreement in the Parity Committee on the proposed cartel contract could
be observed. A disagreement left the decision on approval to the court. The
court normally did not oppose the cartel without a supporting unanimous expert
opinion of the Parity Committee. So the court was very likely to finally approve
the cartel.
Table 13: Cartel Review: Assessment and Changes required
Nr Name Variable Type Source
13.1 change of the agreement binary additional
documents
13.2 reason for the change text additional
documents
13.3 disagreement binary additional
documents
5 Economics of the Cartel
5.1 Cartel Type
In Table 14, we distinguish between four cartel types. Do the members restrict
and cooperate buying, selling, importing oder exporting? Multiple answers
are permitted. For example, an agreement might contain a buyer and a seller
cartel.17
Table 14: Cartel Type
Nr Name Variable Type Source
14.1 buyer cartel binary agreement
14.2 seller cartel binary agreement
14.3 import cartel binary agreement
14.4 export cartel binary agreement
5.2 Collusion Clauses
There are various ways for cartels to segment the market. The simplest and most
common are quotas per firm and exclusive territories. Other forms of market
segmentation involve the cartel members’ production, so that the output of spe-
cific firms is restricted to specific products; or specialization on the market side
17Table 14 does not distinguish on its own between a group of firms that cartelize on
purchase of an input and on selling of an output and two groups of firms where one group
sells a product and a second group purchases the same product within one agreement.
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supplied to or supplied from. We unify the latter into customer/supplier special-
ization not involving exclusive territories and least freight-cost based allocation
of orders to firms. All of this is done in Table 15.
Table 15: Clauses: Market Segmentation
Nr Name Variable Type Source
15.1 sales/purchasing quota binary agreement
15.2 exclusive territories binary agreement
15.3 product specialization binary agreement
15.4 customer/supplier specialization binary agreement
15.5 least freight-cost based alloca-
tion
binary agreement
Table 16 contains alternative pricing arrangements. A cartel for one ho-
mogenous product can involve a fixed price, a price floor, a price ceiling or a
combination of a price floor and a price ceiling. These categories are consid-
ered mutually exclusive. More complex arrangements involve price books. A
price book is a list of prices for different components contained in differentiated
products. The purchase price is then calculated by taking the sum of quantity
weigthed prices of these components.
We separately code arrangements on quantity and sales channels discounts
as well as payment conditions and price conditional on distance, in order to
grasp essential other factors that influence the final price.
Finally, the cartelists’ liability for sales agents captures all different ways to
circumvent the cartel via promotion of sales by any kind of sales agents.
The formation of cartel prices and price changes may be linked to that of
input prices or prices of related goods. We distinguish between first a price
adjustment clause, where the price depends on (an) external price(s) for (an)
input(s) or an alternative good and is automatically adjusted; second, a common
costing sheet private to the cartel, based on an internal price book that defines
which costs have to be considered for calculating the price; and third, price
formation based on average cost and change in cost data as reported by the
cartelists.
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Table 16: Clauses: Prices and Discounts
Nr Name Variable Type Source
16.1 fixed price binary agreement
16.2 price floor binary agreement
16.3 price ceiling binary agreement
16.4 price floor and ceiling binary agreement
16.5 price book binary agreement
16.6 quantity discounts binary agreement
16.7 sales channels discounts binary agreement
16.8 payment conditions binary agreement
16.9 price conditional on distance binary agreement
16.10 liability for sales agents binary agreement
16.11 price adjustment clause binary agreement
16.12 common costing sheet binary agreement
16.13 price based on average cost binary agreement
Capacity restrictions the cartelists commit to in the contract are an obvious
clause to constrain industry output and with it, to enforce higher prices. In
Table 17, we distinguish between restrictions on investment into a new plant or
in another firm, as well as enforcement of layoffs of plants, and restrictions on
the diversion of capacity to non cartelists.
Table 17: Clauses: Capacity
Nr Name Variable Type Source
17.1 restriction on capacity binary agreement
17.2 restriction on capacity diversion
to non cartelists
binary agreement
Some contracts include restrictions of the type that firms downstream or
upstream are forced to trade exclusively with cartelists. In Table 18, we call
this exclusivity in distribution or purchase.
Table 18: Clauses: Vertical Exclusivity Restraints to Outsiders
Nr Name Variable Type Source
18.1 exclusivity in distribution binary agreement
18.2 exclusivity in purchase binary agreement
As to norms, we distinguish, in Table 19, between official norms that are
exogenous to the cartel,18 and lot size that define the packaging size,19 as well
as standardization of product quality endogenous to the cartel.
18Typically, a standard-setting body defines official norms.
19Bundling is not included in this category.
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Table 19: Clauses: Norms
Nr Name Variable Type Source
19.1 official norms binary agreement
19.2 lot size binary agreement
19.3 standardization of product qual-
ity
binary agreement
Some cartel contracts contain clauses involving the cooperation between
cartelists on other than prices or quantities - in particular on R&D and on
advertising. Their existence is coded in summarized form, in Table 20.
Table 20: Clauses: Other cooperation
Nr Name Variable Type Source
20.1 joint research and development binary agreement
20.2 joint advertising binary agreement
Entry prevention captures different forms of aggressive behavior against new
entrants. In Table 21, we distinguish between individual entry prevention where
one member is allowed to deviate from the agreement to prevent entry, and
collective entry prevention where all members react.
Table 21: Clauses: Entry prevention
Nr Name Variable Type Source
21.1 individual entry prevention binary agreement
21.2 collective entry prevention binary agreement
We did not code as yet clauses that appeared very rarely. Thus, we did
not categorize trading conditions like limitation on warranty, restrictions on
exchange, return policies, and on commission and consignment stocks. Further-
more, we did not classify various constraints on non-price competition like timing
of price changes, introduction of new product categories, obligatory patents for
brands, and restrictions on private labels, advertising and bundling. At last,
we did not code further joint activities like joint cashing and the promotion of
working and bidding consortia.
5.3 Organization
The internal organization of the cartels varied substantively. In Table 22, we
distinguish first between a variety of decision making bodies: the plenary meet-
ing where all members of the cartel participate, a committee where less than
all but more than one cartel member participates, and a sole executive officer.
Furthermore, we propose a category for an authorized representative ("Kartell-
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bevollmaechtigter") who is assigned tasks20 that go beyond the legally foreseen
representation in court.21 Finally, we consider a particularly important cat-
egory, called ’arbitration panel’. Normally, in such a panel the two opposing
parties each appoint an arbitrator. These two will select an additional arbitrator
as a chairman of the tribunal.
Table 22: Organization: Decision-Making Bodies
Nr Name Variable Type Source
22.1 plenary meeting binary agreement
22.2 committee binary agreement
22.3 executive officer binary agreement
22.4 authorized representative binary agreement
22.5 arbitration panel binary agreement
The internal day-to-day management of the cartels was also organized in
various ways. In Table 23, we distinguish between an internal staffed office22
or management by a (leading) cartel member. Newly founded firms may also
be part of the day-do-day management. We distinguish between exclusive and
non exclusive joint sales companies organizing the downstream market for the
cartel. Exclusive means that all output of all cartelists is sold via the joint sales
company.
Table 23: Organization: Internal day-to-day Management
Nr Name Variable Type Source
23.1 staffed office binary agreement
23.2 leading cartel member binary agreement
23.3 exclusive joint sales company binary agreement
23.4 non exclusive joint sales com-
pany
binary agreement
Additional external support to the cartel can be given by an independent au-
ditor, an external trustee monitoring the agreement and providing the necessary
or the relevant trade association.23
20For example, producers and importers of pharmaceuticals agreed on the rule that the au-
thorized representative was in charge of investigations on infringements and imposing penal-
ties.
21The authorized representative represents the cartel in the proceedings to register the
cartel.
22This might also be a specific limited liability company. In the paper industry one limited
liability company managed several cartels at the same time.
23For example, the trade association can nominate a member of the arbitration panel.
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Table 24: Organization: External support
Nr Name Variable Type Source
24.1 independent auditor binary agreement
24.2 external trustee binary agreement
24.3 trade association involved binary agreement
As to decisions that involve votings,24 we differentiate, in Table 25, between
different issues and relate them to the decision making bodies coded in Table
22. First, the cartel may fix total output/prices, or their change.25 Second,
decisions involving the admission of firms to, and their exclusion from the cartel
need to be taken. Third, penalties for deviating cartel members need to be
determined. This is a particularly contested issue. It often involves several
levels in a decision hierarchy that possibly are employed consecutively. We code
the supreme decision-making body on these penalties. In the last entry of Table
25, we denote the number of these bodies as specified in the cartel agreement.
Table 25: Organization: Responsibilities
Nr Name Variable Type
25.1 output entries Table 22 agreement
25.2 price entries Table 22 agreement
25.3 approval of entry entries Table 22 agreement
25.4 exclusion entries Table 22 agreement
25.5 penalties (supreme decision-
making body)
entries Table 22 agreement
25.6 levels of jurisdiction for penalties integer agreement
Next we ask for the required majority for the first four decision categories
involved in Table 25.
Table 26: Organization: Voting Rules (Required Majority in %)
Nr Name Variable Type Source
26.1 output numeric agreement
26.2 price numeric agreement
26.3 approval of entry numeric agreement
26.4 exclusion numeric agreement
As to the voting weights individual members of the voting body can carry,
we simply distinguish between one member one vote, weighted voting power,
e.g. according to output, sales, capacity or employees and a mixing variant
24We do not analyze the voting on the cartel contract itself: It has to be signed by all
members - thus unanimity is required.
25c.f. Tables 14 and 15, respectively. Note that quotas necessarily require fixing aggregate
output.
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including per capita and and per weight voting power. We do not differentiate
between different voting weights for different decisions.
Table 27: Organization: Voting Weights for the Cartel Object
Nr Name Variable Type Source
27.1 one member one vote binary agreement
27.2 weighted voting power binary agreement
27.3 mixed voting power (per capita
and per weight)
binary agreement
5.4 Information Exchange
As the cartel members potentially compete with each other and thus almost al-
ways have incentives to deviate from the cartel arrangement, a key issue in the
organization of a cartel involves the provision of information by the cartel mem-
bers, and the monitoring of that information provision. The contracts therefore
include quite elaborate reporting requirements for the cartelists, as naturally re-
lated to the clauses employed in the cartel. In Table 28, we distinguish between
rules involving mutual information provision, and those involving reporting to
a central body.
Table 28: Information Exchange: Cartel-internal Auditing
Nr Name Variable Type Source
28.1 mutual information between all
members
binary agreement
28.2 information to a central body entries agreement
Tables 22, 23, 24
The periodicity of required reporting rules from the cartelists to the central
body indicates the intensity at which the cartel’s economic activity is moni-
tored by some central body. In Table 29 we code the frequency per year at
which cartelists are required to provide data on quantities, revenues and ex-
ports, respectively. In addition, we code the annual frequency of reports from
the cartel management back to the individual cartel members.
Table 29: Information Exchange: Annual Internal Reporting Frequency
Nr Name Variable Type Source
29.1 quantity integer agreement
29.2 revenues integer agreement
29.3 exports integer agreement
29.4 report by management to mem-
bers
integer agreement
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In some cases, the cartelists are required to report demand and/or supply
before it is exercised. One reason is that the cartel wanted full control over the
payment or any other delivery conditions. This is coded in Table 30.
Table 30: Information Exchange: Ex-ante Notification
Nr Name Variable Type Source
30.1 ex-ante demand binary agreement
30.2 ex-ante supply binary agreement
Much more frequent are reports ex-post to the cartel management. In Table
31 we distinguish between reports on individual and aggregate sales of the typical
cartelist.
Table 31: Information Exchange: Ex-post Notification
Nr Name Variable Type Source
31.1 individual sales binary agreement
31.2 aggregate sales binary agreement
In Table 32 we distinguish between accounting requirements for sales in
general, and specifically for exports. The latter is important in view of the
incentive to cirvumvent a sales quota via re-imports.
Table 32: Information Exchange: Sales vs. Exports
Nr Name Variable Type Source
32.1 sales binary agreement
32.2 exports binary agreement
5.5 Compensation Schemes
All sharing rules, e.g. quotas or profits, are typically specified ex ante, and
not (exactly) realized ex post. In Table 33 we distinguish between several com-
pensation mechanisms for deviations from the agreement so generated within a
certain period.26 Multiple answers are possible.
Table 33: Compensation Schemes
Nr Name Variable Type Source
33.1 carry-over to the next period binary agreement
33.2 cash payments binary agreement
33.3 sales between cartelists binary agreement
33.4 transfer of customers or orders binary agreement
33.5 earnings redistribution binary agreement
26The period considered may vary between two months and a year.
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5.6 Penalties
Penalties punish a cartel member for a deviation from the agreement. The
penalties specified in our contracts are surprisingly varied. Our code reflects
only a first cut into a larger pie worth detailed investigation.
In Table 34, we distinguish between different forms of non-monetary penal-
ties. For vertical cartels, the refusal to deal by the upstream or downstream
industry sanctions the firm in the opposite industry.
Table 34: Non-Monetary Penalties
Nr Name Variable Type Source
34.1 warning binary agreement
34.2 exclusion from the cartel binary agreement
34.3 refusal to deal binary agreement
Monetary penalties may be specified in absolute terms; or related to eco-
nomic variables, in particular the (absolute or percentage wise) deviation from
magnitudes specified in the contract. In Table 35, we consider absolute penal-
ties (in Austrian Schillings (ATS)), and in Table 36 relative penalties. Both are
related to different forms of deviating from the cartel contract. In Table 35, we
code the maximal penalties specified in the cartel contract.
Table 35: Absolute Penalties
Nr Name Variable Type Source
35.1 infringement of the cartel clause integer agreement
35.2 provision of false data integer agreement
35.3 refusal to provide information integer agreement
Table 36: Relative penalties (Upper Limits, in percent of)
Nr Name Variable Type Source
36.1 deviation from the cartel clause integer agreement
36.2 deviation from revenues agreed
upon
integer agreement
In many cases, penalties were specified to be paid directly by the firms.
In some cases, however, the cartel organization required a security deposit per
participating firm ("Kaution") to ensure the immediate payment of a penalty.
Surprisingly, that security deposit (in form of a bill of exchange) was sometimes
unlimited, as specified in Table 37.
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Table 37: Penalties: Security deposits
Nr Name Variable Type Source
37.1 upper limit of the security de-
posit
integer agreement
37.2 unlimited security deposit binary agreement
5.7 Entry into, and Exit from the Cartel
Table 38 refers to conditions specified in the cartel contract, under which a
potential entrant could become a member of the cartel. We consider conditions
(’minimal entry requirements’) that had to be fulfilled by the potential entrants,
and clauses where the approval of entry was subject to discussion in some cartel
body. Note that these categories are not mutually exclusive.
Table 38: Voluntary Entry/Exit: Rules for Entry
Nr Name Variable Type Source
38.1 minimal entry requirements binary agreement
38.2 entry subject to approval binary agreement
We code information on exit in Table 39. In several cases a cartelist had to
announce its exit in advance. We code the period of notice of withdrawal (in
months). Furthermore, several cases permitted exit only at certain dates with
a long interval period in between. Such a typical case involves the possibility to
exit only at the end of every other year with a three months notice.27Finally,
we code for clauses that allow for exits of other cartelists subsequent to an exit
of a particular firm.
Table 39: Voluntary Entry/Exit: Rules for Exit
Nr Name Variable Type Source
39.1 period of notice (in months) integer agreement
39.2 calculated interval between exit
dates (years)
integer agreement
39.3 subsequent exit allowed binary agreement
27In a few vertical agreements, the withdrawal notice for the upstream manufacturer and
that ofthe downstream trading partner differ, e.g. upstrem: 3 months, donwstream: 6 months.
We took the withdrawal notice for the upstream manufacturer.
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